

PULP EXHIBIT A
TIMELINE
History of Long Island/Rockaways Electric System
14 Dec 2022

P-KEY to table:	
LIPA/PSEG LI related events (TS Irene, Hurricane Sandy, TS Isaias)	Regulatory and contractual events affecting LIPA's provision of service in New York
Con Ed related events	Irene, Sandy, Isaias storm related events
Customer service specific related events	(alternating w/white)
*Endnote sources in 3d column	

1911	Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) formed from merger of several small local utilities	
1985	Long Island Power Act created municipal subdivision: Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) --state agency created --refi of Shoreham & other LILCO debt (tax-free bonds) --doesn't have to pay dividends or corporate taxes --PSL section 3-b governs PSC-DPS-LIPA relationships	
1992	LIPA bought Shoreham from LILCO for \$1 and closed it. (Shoreham ran over budget, completed, given test run, but never put into service. Could NOT evacuate safely.)	
1994	Shoreham dismantled	
Dec 1996	Brooklyn Union & LILCO agree to merge (combined rev \$4.5 bn; 2.2 mn customers)	
1998	LILCO defunct	
	Bond underwriters paid LIPA for first half of its \$7bn bond issue (largest municipal bond sale in US history)	
	With \$2.5 bn of \$7 bn, LIPA bought LILCO's electricity service system	
May 1998	LIPA acquired electrical transmission network (distribution infrastructure, all system & customer services, LILCO's 18% interest in 9 Mile Point 2) --one of biggest elect utilities in US: • 1st in projected revenues [\$2.1 bn/yr]; • 3d in customers [>1mn]; • 4th power sold [17,707,000 megawatt hrs/yr] --7th highest rates in US	
	Electrical distribution system (5 electricity generating plants) and all natural gas operations merged with Brooklyn Union Gas to form (ultimately) KeySpan Energy	
	LIPA will hire KeySpan to --provide electricity from its generating plants for next 15 years --operate all electricity services for 8 years --Eventually other companies will be allowed to bid on supplying and running system	
27 Aug 2011	Tropical Storm Irene pummeled LIPA service area, with sustained winds of 40-50 mph and gusts in excess of 90 mph	

	Single largest storm to affect Long Island since 1985's Hurricane Gloria	*15
	Tropical force winds, heavy rains, flooding, and downed trees, poles and power lines resulted in more than 523,000 LIPA customers without power (most of any TS Irene-affected utility)	
	3,500 extra personnel were required to aid in the service restoration effort	*15
	Took over 1 week to restore power	*15
	900 poles, 1000 transformers, 80 switches and over 1 million feet of wire and cable were replaced	*15
	In response to Governor Cuomo's request, the New York Department of Public Service (DPS) initiated Case 12-E-0283 <u>In the Matter of the Review of Long Island Power Authority's Preparedness and Response to Hurricane Irene.</u>	*15
	LIPA did not fall under the scope of the Public Service Law or within general regulatory purview of DPS or the New York Public Service Commission (PSC), so LIPA had to agree to a Memorandum of Understanding with DPS for DPS to evaluate LIPA's storm preparation and service restoration efforts.	*16
15 Dec 2011	LIPA contracted w/NJ-based Public Service Enterprise Group (PSEG) to operate LIPA's electric infrastructure on LIPA's behalf for 12 years	*15
28 Dec 2011	LIPA and PSEG entered into an Operations Services Agreement (First OSA) in order to provide for the operation and maintenance of LIPA's Transmission and Distribution System. OSA was subsequently amended by Amendment Nos. 1 and 2, and by Letter Agreement, dated June 22, 2012	
28 Dec 2011	LIPA and PSEG entered a Transition Services Agreement, as amended by Amendment No. 1	
28 Jun 2012	DPS issued report based on review of LIPA's storm preparedness and restoration response to Aug. 2011 TS Irene, with DPS issuing 51 specific recommendations to enhance LIPA's emergency planning process	*15
	Most significant DPS report recommendations relate to: --LIPA's poor communications with customers and public officials (lack of accessibility to company; timing and inaccuracy of messaging to customers, both of which implicated Outage Management Systems and pre-storm emergency planning) --Right of Way management and tree trimming practices (implicating system maintenance practices, vegetation management, storm hardening, and other practices to prepare for and mitigate impact of a major storm)	*15
24 Oct 2012	Wave that had started off of African coast turned from tropical storm into Hurricane Sandy, with wind speeds at least 74 mph	
24 Oct	Made landfall on Jamaica as a Category 1 hurricane	
25 Oct	Made landfall on Cuba as a Category 3 hurricane	
26 Oct 10:27 am	NJ declared statewide state of emergency	

27 Oct	National Hurricane Center forecast a 6 to 11 ft. storm surge inundation	
27 Oct 7 pm	Metro-North RR and LIRR suspended service	
28 Oct	Cuomo declared State of Emergency in all NY counties	
	NYSE closed (1st weather-related closing since 1888 blizzard)	
	Nassau Co Exec ordered voluntary evacuations of South Shore storm surge area, North Shore, and in elevations 15 feet above sea level or less	
	Suffolk Co ordered mandatory evacuation of Fire Island and in surge zone areas (Babylon, Brookhaven, Islip, Riverhead, Southampton, and Southold)	
	Mayor Bloomberg ordered --NYC schools closed effective Oct 29 --mandatory evacuations for Zone A (includes southern tip Manhattan; Coney Island-Brighton Beach, Red Hook; Rockaways Peninsula; much of Staten Island; part of Throg's Neck area)	
29 Oct	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Airlines canceled all flights • MTA suspended all subway, bus & commuter rail service • PATH train service & stations closed • Bus carriers at Port Authority Bus Terminal closed • NYS Courts closed • Tappan Zee Bridge closed due to wind conditions 	
29 Oct 3 pm	Less than 100,000 without power across NY State	*20
	ConEd preemptively disconnected swaths of Lower Manhattan and Brooklyn to protect equipment and reduce potential downtime	*12
29 Oct 5 pm	National Hurricane Center reclassified Sandy as a "post-tropical cyclone" (lacked strong thunderstorm activity near its center; its energy didn't come from warm ocean waters but from the jet stream; it had lost its eye)	
29 Oct 7:30 pm	Sandy made landfall in Brigantine, NJ, with 80 mph winds and a wind field that extended for nearly 1,000 miles (three times that of a typical hurricane).	
	820 mile diameter wind field upon landfall (more than 2x landfall size of Hurricanes Isaac and Irene combined)	*21
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sandy's northwest track toward NY coast with its enormous winds and the storm's low pressure were responsible for the catastrophic storm surge into southeastern New York. • Timing of the surge coincided with normal high tide, as well as a full moon, which added to the increase in water. 	*13
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Battery recorded highest water level on record for Manhattan: a storm surge of 9.4 feet, corresponding to 14.06 ft above the average low tide 	
29 Oct 9 pm	Con Ed substation on East 13th Street flooded and a transformer exploded	*18
	In NYC, 818,000 Con Ed customers lost power for 10 days (242 hours, 59 min)	*18

	Con Ed committed \$250 million to post-Sandy upgrades	*18
	Almost all areas south of Empire State Building lost power when floodwaters inundated several substations	*12
	On Staten Island and in the Rockaways, 120,000 customers lost power due to substation damage	*12
	All around NYC, strong winds took down overhead lines, affecting 390,000 customers	*12
29 Oct 10:45 pm	Indian Point nuclear power plant (unit #3) shut down because of external electrical grid issues (per Entergy)	
30 Oct 3 pm	2 million without power in NY State	*20
	Sandy battered NYC region for over 48 hours	
	17% of NYC (51 square miles) flooded	*4
	One of then-deadliest storms in US	
	43 NYC residents died directly as a result of Sandy (mostly in Staten Island); 5 more died from carbon monoxide	*12
	12 died in NJ, 5 in CT	*12
	Over 300 homes were destroyed	*12
	Residential electrical fire caused by storm burned down 126 homes in Breezy Point, Queens (one of worst residential fires in NYC history)	
	Bellevue Hospital Center evacuated more than 700 patients after backup power generators failed	
	NYU Langone Med Center evacuated more than 200 patients after backup power system failed	
	Critical public and private infrastructure was damaged	*12
	Many New Yorkers were left vulnerable with limited access to food, drinking water, healthcare, critical services	*11
	Resulted in one of the largest mobilizations of public services in NYC history	*11
	\$19 billion in damages and lost economic activity across NYC; \$32 billion statewide	*11
	Over 69,000 residential units were damaged	*11
	Floodwaters entered homes of more than 443,000 people and more than 23,400 businesses	*12
	Statewide, 305,000 homes were destroyed	*12
	Large swath of Manhattan (from Midtown to the Battery) left without power	*12
	Con Ed claimed that at one point on Oct 30, more than 650,000 customers were without power, including 59 NYC Housing Authority developments	*14
31 Oct 3 pm	2.2 million without power in NY State	*20
	84,000 of Natl Grid's natural gas customers lost service, because valves had to be shut to isolate flooded pipes	
1 Nov am	Gov Cuomo issued written ultimatum to LIPA heads and other top utilities, including Con Ed, saying they had time to prepare	*3

	for the storm, and that the state certs of the private companies, and even their jobs, were on the line	
	Cuomo said he would "make every change necessary to ensure [LIPA] lives up to its public responsibility. It goes without saying that such failures would warrant the removal of the management responsible for such colossal misjudgments."	*3
1 Nov 3 pm	1.3 million without power in NY State	*20
	Con Ed reported more than 100,000 power lines had been knocked down	*2
	Con Ed reported 900,000 customers had lost power due to storm in NYC and Westchester County	*2
	Con Ed reported that 250,000 of 900,000 had been restored by Nov 1	*2
	Con Ed anticipated having power restored to Lower Manhattan by Nov 3	*2
	Con Ed expected restoring power to the vast majority of customers who lost it by Nov 10 and 11, and that the remaining restorations could take an additional week more	*2
2 Nov am	Gov Cuomo re-issued ultimatum to LIPA, verbally: "I want them held accountable for their performance . . . they're businessmen, why shouldn't they be?"	*3
2 Nov am	Con Ed claimed <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 226,000 lacked service in Manhattan • 84,000 in Queens • 35,000 in Brooklyn • 54,000 in Staten Island • 31,000 in Bronx • 140,000 in Westchester 	
	LIPA received unprecedented levels of reinforcements--900 line workers from Canada, Florida & Arizona, some airlifted through arrangements made by Cuomo	*3
	LIPA reported that at the height of the outages caused by Sandy, 945,000 of its 1,126,633 customers in Nassau, Suffolk, and the Rockaway Peninsula were without power	*3
2 Nov	LIPA reported 465,000 customers still without power	*3
	LIPA expected to restore power to all but 97,000 customers by Nov. 2	*3
	LIPA expected to cut number of customer outages by 150,000 by Nov 6	*3
	LIPA was not addressing the 100,000 who because of damage to or loss of their homes--rather than damage to the LIPA system--cannot receive power	*3
2 Nov 3 pm	1.2 million without power in NY State	*20
2 Nov pm	Con Ed restored power to 84,000 Staten Island customers	*14
3 Nov am	Con Ed announced that all Manhattan power networks were back online	*14

3 Nov 3 pm	900,000 without power in NY State	*20
3 Nov 8 pm	Con Ed claimed <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 153,000 customers lacked service, including • 74,067 in Queens • 27,842 in Staten Island • 24,707 in Brooklyn • 19,501 in the Bronx • 9,211 in Manhattan 	*14
4 Nov 3 pm	750,000 without power NY State	*20
	Damaged substations in NYC were repaired within 4-5 days	*12
5 Nov pm	Con Ed claimed 90,586 customers still lacked power in the boroughs	*14
5 Nov 3 pm	500,000 without power in NY State	*19
7 Nov 3 pm	330,000 without power in NY State	*19
8 Nov 3 pm	400,000 without power in NY State (increase likely due to effects of nor'easter storm 11/7)	*19
	After Hurricane Irene, it took more than 7 days to restore 523,000 outages	*3
	After Hurricane Gloria, it took 11 days to restore service	
13 Nov - 30 Nov	In a span of 17 days, four LIPA officials--the COO; VP Customer Service; a member of the Board of Trustees; and LIPA chairman--all resigned over handling of Sandy's power outages	
14 Nov	Repair to whole overhead electrical system took 2 weeks	*12
	632,000 LIPA Long Island customers without power for two weeks (337 hours)	*18
	To restore power: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Workforce of over 15,000 • Replaced 4500 poles • Replaced more than 2100 transformers • Repaired around 400 miles of wire • Repaired around 40 substations 	*18
	LIPA & Nat'l Grid put cost of response and restoration between \$800 and \$850 million	*18
	Significant reason for extent of damage is that the most important utility infrastructure is on the waterfront	*12
Two weeks out from landfall	Con Ed's steam system (servicing 1700 large buildings and major hospitals) repaired after 2 weeks, because four of six steam plants and utility tunnels were inundated	*12
	In Rockaways, 97% reported being w/o HEAT at some point after Sandy	*19
	In Rockaways, 77% reported being w/o HEAT for 15-21 days	*19
	In Rockaways, 79% reported being w/o ELEC for 15-21 days	*19
21 Nov 2012 (three weeks out)	In Rockaways, 30-50% households still w/o basic utilities (electricity, heat, telephone)	*19
26 Nov 2012 (one month)	25,000,000,000 estimated value of lost business activity as a result of Sandy	*21

	57,000 utility workers from 30 states and Canada came to NY to assist Con Ed in restoring power to NYC	*21
Dec 2012	Mayor Bloomberg started "Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency" (SIRR) to analyze climate change and its impact on NYC and the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy	*12
9 Jan 2013	Cuomo called for transfer of LIPA to PSEG-LI	
23 Jan	8,200 still without power after Sandy, many in Rockaway	*10
29 Jan	Congress passed Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013 - emergency relief funding to multiple Federal agencies to assist recovery efforts	
	NYC received \$4.2 bn Community Development Block Grant - Disaster Recovery to address range of needs, including rebuilding & rehabbing housing, assisting displaced tenants, providing aid to businesses, & bolstering coastal defenses	
May 2013	Cuomo announced plan to give PSEG control of day-to-day operations of LIPA's electric grid under a management contract	
May 2013	Bloomberg's SIRR initiative issued report that includes initiative for Con Ed to protect the Farragut substation from future storm surge <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farragut substation came close to flooding • Farragut serves almost 500,000 customers (or approx. 1.25 million people) • Farragut substation sits in known flood plain • Suggests Con Ed consider floodwalls or other measures • Suggests project could be incorporation into Con Ed's then-approaching rate case at PSC 	*12
	SIRR evaluated and made recommendations for initiatives for utility resilience ("Chapter 6: Utilities" extracted and attached to email)	*12
29 Jul 2013	NY legislature passed, and Governor Cuomo signed, LIPA Reform Act (implementing Cuomo's plan of May 2013)	
31 Dec 2013	LIPA and PSEG, seeking to align First OSA more closely with LIPA Reform Act, entered into the Amended and Restated Operations Services Agreement (Second OSA), which amended and restated the First OSA in its entirety	
1 Jan 2014	PSEG rebranded LIPA as "PSEG Long Island" (PSEG LI)	
	PSL sect. 3-b <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --grants PSC ability to review & make recommendations in re: LIPA's electric retail rates & spending, --BUT PSC does not have power to set those rates or expenditure levels. --Can inspect LIPA's facilities, books & records (but not affiliates') --DPS has LIPA field office to reinforce recommendation & inspection capability (\$8 mn/yr) 	
3 Aug 2020 11 pm	Hurricane Isaias made landfall at Ocean Isle Beach, NC	

4 Aug 2020	Downgraded Tropical Storm Isaias landed on Long Island with rain and wind gusts up to 70 mph	
	650,000 PSEG LI customers without power	*5
	All of PSEG LI's restoration and communication systems failed	*5
	Over 1 million customer calls received busy signals and 300,000 text messages bounced back	*5
	The outage map, the municipal portal for government officials, and the mobile phone application failed	*5
	PSEG LI's outage management system (used to dispatch trucks, estimate restoration times and coordinate outage restoration) failed	*5
	PSEG LI was unsure how many customers were without power throughout the storm	*5
	The information PSEG LI communicated with customers was inaccurate	*5
	Restoration of power took eight days	
20 Aug 2020	New York State Legislature held joint public hearing to address emergency storm response and customer communication	
13 Nov 2020	DPS identified more than 70 potential violations of PSEG LI's Emergency Restoration Plan	
	DPS recommended, among others, that LIPA	
	1. Evaluate options to terminate PSEG LI as LIPA's service provider;	
	2. Declare PSEG LI's poor performance during Isaias as a first failure of the Major Storm Performance Metric as defined in the Operating Service Agreement between LIPA and PSEG;	
	3. Seek to either terminate or renegotiate the Second OSA to enable greater oversight by LIPA and DPS	
18 Nov 2020	Based on DPS investigation and LIPA's Isaias Task Force 90-Day Report, LIPA Board of Trustees found that PSEG LI had failed to meet its contractual obligations to LIPA for storm restoration	*6
18 Dec 2020	LIPA released "Phase I Options Analysis for the Management of LIPA's Assets," (Phase I Options) which explored three potential alternatives for future management of LIPA's assets: 1. Privatize; 2. Continue to contract day-to-day management to PSEG LI or another utility under a re-negotiated contract; and 3. Terminate PSEG LI contract and directly manage LIPA operations	*6
	Phase I Options report 1. Found that privatization would significantly raise residential customer bills by an average \$32/month; 2. Recommended changes that would be required under a reformed contract with PSEG LI; and 3. Identified that terminating PSEG LI contract and directly managing LIPA assets was feasible and could result in savings of up to \$815 million over the term of the agreement	*6

	As a result of Phase I Options report, LIPA Board directed LIPA's CEO to pursue both a renegotiation of PSEG LI management contract as well as plan for termination of PSEG LI contract, with LIPA taking over direct management of utility assets, and report back no later than March 31, 2021	*6
Apr 2021	LIPA released "Phase II Report of its Options Analysis"	*6
	Phase II Options report detailed pros and cons of four management options: 1. Sell LIPA's assets to private investors; 2. Reset PSEG LI relationship and reform the contract; 3. Contract with a new service provider to improve operations; 4. Bring utility operations under LIPA management.	*6
May 2021	LIPA Board of Trustees held two virtual public comment hearings on the Phase II Options	*6
28 Jun 2021	PSEG LI agreed to a non-binding term sheet that addressed issues discovered during LIPA's Isaias investigations	*6
	1. Greater share of management compensation at risk based on performance;	*6
	2. Expand performance metrics covering all categories of service;	*6
	3. Use gating and default metrics;	*6
	4. Strengthen Long Island-based management and accountability for Long Island operations;	*6
	5. Require compliance with Board recommendations to address known deficiencies	*6
	6. Strengthen oversight in long-term planning, project prioritization, and budget development	*6
	7. Partition Long Island IT systems and facilitate independent verification and validation	*6
15 Nov 2021	LIPA 2022 Performance Metrics, with metrics CS-1 through CS-19 addressing Customer Service	*7
23 Nov 2021	NY PSC Chair and Chief Executive Officer Rory M. Christian recommends to LIPA Board of Trustees that the Board adopt a Reformed Operations Services Agreement (Reformed Contract) between LIPA and PSEG LI, describing it as providing a "quantum surge" in oversight by DPS, enhancing the terms and conditions of the Second OSA to the benefit of customers, and including new or improved mechanisms to ensure accountability by PSEG LI and that "puts customers first and provides LIPA and the DPS greater oversight authority."	*17
	Chair Christian highlighted that the Reformed Contract puts a majority of PSEG LI's compensation at risk; established a new DPS-led process of accountability, which subjects PSEG LI to investigation by DPS for failures to comply with LIPA's Emergency Response Plan and failures to provide safe, adequate, and reliable service to customers; and obligates PSEG	*17

	LI to participate in the same administrative and investigative processes applied to New York's other Investor Owned Utilities	
30 Mar 2022	NY AG and NYS Comptroller Approve the Reformed Contract between LIPA and PSEG LI, dated as of December 15, 2021, as amended, approved and in effect on April 1, 2022. https://www.lipower.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/2nd-AR-OSA-in-effect-on-4-1-2022-1.pdf	
28 Oct 2022	10 years out from Sandy, 79% of NYC land designated for electric and gas utilities is in the floodplain	*4
	by 2050, 81% of NYC land designated for electric and gas utilities is expected to be in the floodplain	*4
	17% of public housing is in flood zone	*4
	by 2050, 26% of public housing is expected to be in the floodplain	*4
	Post-Sandy resiliency projects require complex coordination with existing utility lines	*4
	Plodding recovery efforts have left billions of federal dollars on the table as resiliency projects stall, including ones that would add backup power in the event of an outage	*4
	Post-Sandy, NYC rebuilt 492 houses 6,742 needed "moderate rehab" NYC bought 247 that weren't worth fixing up NYC spent \$135.2 mn on reimbursements to homeowners	*1
13 Nov 2022	LIPA Proposed 2023 Performance Metric, with metrics CS-01 through CS-29 addressing Customer Service.	*8
16 Nov 2022	LIPA Quarterly Report on 2022 Performance Metrics and Board Recommendations	*9

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